On the morning of February 18th, 2010, a police chief in Dubai sat in a darkened room staring at a wall of screens.
His name was Dahi Kalfan Tamim, Lieutenant General, 30 years on the force.
He had seen murders before.
He had seen drug deals, smuggling rings, and every kind of crime a glittering desert city can produce.
But he had never seen anything like this.
On the screens in front of him, recorded by more than a hundred cameras spread across airports, hotel lobbies, elevators, and corridors, was a ghost story.
26 people moving through Dubai like smoke, checking into hotels, changing clothes in bathrooms, talking into devices strapped to their wrists, following one man, one target, one room.
And by the time the last of them boarded a flight out of the country, that man was dead on his bed in a locked hotel room with a bottle of heart medicine on the nightstand beside him.
No bruises, no blood, no sign that anyone had been there at all.
The door was chain locked from the inside.
General Tamim leaned forward.
He pressed rewind and he watched it all again because what he was looking at frame by frame, minute by minute, was one of the most elaborate intelligence operations in modern history.
Captured entirely on camera.
Every face, every movement, every mistake.
The target’s name was Mahmud al-Mabu, a man who had been on Israel’s kill list for 21 years.
A man who had survived three previous attempts on his life.
A man who once told a journalist, “You have to be alert.
He was not alert enough.
” What followed was a collision between one of the world’s most feared intelligence agencies and one of the world’s most surveiled cities.
A collision between old school spycraft and modern technology.
between a teen trained to be invisible and a network of cameras that saw everything.
This is the story of how 26 agents used 12 fake passports to kill a Hamas commander inside his five-star hotel room.
How they nearly pulled off the perfect crime and how the very perfection of their work is what gave them away.
But to understand why MSAD sent 26 people to a hotel in Dubai, you have to go back 21 years to a dusty road in Gaza, to a white Subaru with Israeli license plates, and to a young man inside that car dressed as an Orthodox Jewish rabbi with a gun hidden under his seat.
That young man was Mahmud al-Mabu.
In 1989, the first inifat was tearing through the Palestinian territories.
Hamas was barely 2 years old.
Its founders, including Shik Ahmed Yasin, wanted to send a message to Israel that this was not just a movement of stones and protests.
They wanted blood.
Yasin’s internal security leaders, Salah Shahada, and Yaya Senoir, were already in Israeli prison.
So, Hamas created a new structure, a small secret unit designed for one purpose, kidnapping Israeli soldiers.
They called it unit 101 and the man chosen to lead it was a 29-year-old former car mechanic and weightlifter from the Jabalia refugee camp.
Mahmud al-Mabu.
On February 16th, 1989, a young Israeli sergeant named Ai Sasportas was hitchhiking home to the city of Ashto after military service.
He was 20 years old, a member of the elite maglin unit.
He was standing at the Hadaya roundabout when a white Subaru pulled up.
Inside were two men dressed in the black hats and long coats of ultraorththodox Jews.
They offered him a ride.
Susporis climbed in.
He never made it home.
According to Al-Mabu’s own confession recorded on camera by Al Jazzer just weeks before his death in 2010, he was the driver.
He gave a pre-arranged signal to the man beside him.
two shots to the face, one to the chest.
The soldier’s body was stripped and buried on the side of the road.
His remains would not be found for three months.
Less than 3 months later, on May 3rd, 1989, the same unit struck again.
Corporal Elon Sadon was hitchhiking from Latrun toward Ashcolon when a car stopped.
Same method, same disguise, orthodox Jewish clothing.
Only one seat available because the back was loaded with equipment.
Sadon got in alone.
His friend stayed behind.
During the ride, there was a struggle.
A gunshot to the head.
Saddon’s body was buried at a scrapyard near Palm.
His remains would not be found until 1996.
Almabu and the other squad members fled Gaza within weeks.
They crossed through the Rafa border into Egypt, then onto the Gulf.
Al-Mabu eventually settled in Damascus, Syria, where he rose through the ranks of Hamas’s military wing, the Isadin Al-Cassam brigades.
He became their chief of logistics, their weapons man, the person responsible for building a pipeline of Iranian rockets, guided missiles, and anti-tank weapons flowing into Gaza.
For 20 years, he moved through the shadows.
Five passports under different names, multiple countries, arms deals brokered in hotel lobbies across the Middle East, in quiet meetings in cartoon, in safe houses in Thran.
He was the middleman between Hamas and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, specifically the Kuds force.
His job, buy weapons and get them into Gaza.
Anti-tank missiles, guided rockets, long range projectiles capable of reaching deep into Israeli territory.
These did not appear in Gaza by accident.
They traveled through a chain Almabu had spent years constructing from Iranian factories to Sudin ports to tunnels under the Egyptian border into the strip.
According to Israeli intelligence assessments, the weapons he smuggled were directly responsible for significant Israeli casualties during Operation Castled in late 2008 when Hamas fired rockets into southern Israel when anti-tank missiles struck Israeli armored vehicles.
The man who made it possible was sitting in a Damascus apartment planning the next shipment.
He was not just a target of convenience, he was the pipeline itself.
And MSAD understood that killing him would not just remove a commander from the board, it would collapse an entire supply chain.
He survived a car bombing.
He survived a poisoning in Beirut in 2009 that left him unconscious for 36 hours.
He survived a third attempt linked to the assassination of another Hamas commander in Damascus in 2004 when he noticed a device attached to his car just in time.
three times, three failures.
But inside MSAD headquarters in Tel Aviv, a file with his name on it never closed.
In the language of Israeli intelligence, Mahmud al-Mabu had a red page, a code name for a standing assassination order.
And the man who held the authority to execute that order was Mayer Dan, the director of MSAD.
A man known within the agency for one thing above all else.
He did not hesitate.
In early 2010, MSAD’s Signals Intelligence Division intercepted something unexpected.
Al-Mabu had booked a flight online.
Emirates flight 912, Damascus to Dubai.
January 19th, he would be traveling alone.
No bodyguards, no security detail, just a middle-aged man with a fake passport and a business meeting.
It was the kind of opportunity that comes once.
On January 15th, 2010, a meeting was called in the large conference room near Mayor Don’s office at MSAD headquarters.
The most important person in the room after Don himself, was a man known only by his code name, Holiday.
He was bald, stocky, the head of Cesaria, the branch of MSAD responsible for the AY’s most sensitive operations abroad.
Cesaria recruits from Israeli special forces.
Its operators are trained in surveillance, infiltration, and elimination.
Within Cesaria sits an even smaller unit called Kedon, the assassins.
Holiday had been tracking Al-Maboo for over a year.
His team had planted a Trojan horse on the target’s computer.
They had hacked his email server.
They had intercepted his phone calls.
They knew his travel patterns, which cities he visited, which hotels he preferred, which aliases he used.
They had mapped his network of arms dealers in Dubai, his banking contacts, even his shopping habits.
They knew that he favored hotels near the airport, that he often requested interior rooms, that he rarely stayed more than two nights.
More importantly, they had already sent advanced teams to Dubai three times in the previous 6 months.
These operatives had walked the lobbies of every hotel where Al-Maboo had ever stayed.
They had photographed entrances, exits, elevator positions, and stairwells.
They had noted the placement of security cameras, the shift changes of hotel staff, the timing of housekeeping rounds on each floor.
They had tested the electronic lock systems used by Dubai’s major hotel chains.
They had built a map of the city’s surveillance infrastructure, so detailed that in theory, every move on the day of the operation could be choreographed down to the minute.
And still it would not be enough.
Now with 4 days notice, Holiday wanted authorization for the kill.
There was one problem, a serious one.
The documentation department said they could not produce new falsified passports for the entire team in 4 days.
There were more than two dozen operatives who needed to enter Dubai.
Some of them would be entering the country with the same identities and the same cover stories for the third time in barely six months.
The risk of detection was significant.
In earlier years, under more cautious leadership, the operation would have been cancelled for that reason alone.
But Dan was not cautious and Holiday was not patient.
The decision was made.
Send the team with existing papers.
Reuse the passports.
Take the risk.
Dan dictated his decision to an assistant.
Two words that would set everything in motion.
Plasma screen authorized for execution.
The code name was not random.
In the years before 2010, Dubai was famous for its electronics markets.
Agents who had previously traveled there used a cover story.
They had come to buy a plasma screen television.
The phrase became shorthand when operatives communicated with each other.
Viewing the plasma screen meant Mahmud al-Mabu.
It meant the mission was active.
And now it was.
At 6:30 on the morning of January 18th, 2010, 19 hours before Al-Maboo would be found dead, the first three members of the Plasma Screen team landed at Dubai International Airport.
They carried passports identifying them as Michael Bowdenheimer, a German national, and James Leonard Clark, a British citizen.
A third operative, the only woman on the initial team, arrived from Paris on an Irish passport under the name Gail Foliard.
They passed through immigration without incident.
They checked into separate hotels across the city.
They did not call each other.
They did not meet in person.
To coordinate, they use encrypted short-range communication devices, technology that operated below the detection threshold of standard surveillance equipment.
For longer range communication, they used disposable mobile phones.
But here is where tradecraft met reality.
Dubai police would later trace a high volume of calls and text messages between three phones carried by team members and four numbers registered in Austria.
a command center, a remote nerve center where someone was directing the entire operation from across the Mediterranean.
Over the next several hours, more operatives arrived, from Frankfurt, from Rome, from Zurich, from Paris.
They scattered their arrival times across the entire day.
Different flights, different airlines, different terminals, different hotels.
Each operative checked in alone.
each carried a cover story.
Business, tourism, electronic shopping.
Dubai in January is warm, cosmopolitan, and full of European visitors.
26 additional faces in a city of millions should have been invisible.
According to former MSAD officer Dan Megan, author of a book on Israeli intelligence, the total number of operatives who entered Dubai for Operation Plasma Screen was at least 26.
Some accounts suggest the number may have been higher with additional support agents who were never identified by Dubai police.
All of them were recorded on state-of-the-art surveillance cameras.
They just did not know it yet.
The team split into units.
Nobody knew which hotel Almabu would choose.
He had stayed at several different properties on previous visits.
So, three surveillance groups fanned out across the city, each staking out a hotel where the target had previously been a guest.
A fourth unit was assigned to the airport.
Their job was simple.
Spot him when he arrived and follow him to wherever he checked in.
At 3:15 on the afternoon of January 19th, Emirates Flight 912 touched down in Dubai.
Among the passengers was a man traveling under the name Mahmud Abdul Rau Muhammad.
It was a fake name, a fake passport, but the face was real.
And somewhere in that terminal, a woman was listening, not for his face, for his voice.
According to intelligence accounts, this female operative had been trained to identify Al-Maboo by the sound of his voice using recordings from his Alazer interview.
She heard him speak at the immigration counter.
She confirmed the identification and within seconds the information was relayed through encrypted short-range devices to every unit in the city.
The target was on the ground.
Two agents followed Almaboo’s taxi from the airport.
He drove to the Albustan Rotana, a five-star hotel near the airport.
It was not the hotel the team had predicted, but it did not matter.
Two operatives were already inside the Rotana’s lobby when Al-Maboo walked through the front door.
They were dressed as tennis players, white athletic wear, towels draped conspicuously over their shoulders, rackets in their hands, and this is the detail that would later haunt the operation.
The rackets had no cases.
They were carrying bare tennis rackets through a hotel lobby as if they had just stepped off a court, except there was no court nearby.
And no one carries a tennis racket without its case unless they are trying to look like a tennis player rather than actually being one.
Dubai police chief Tamim would later ask the question that everyone watching the footage asked, “Where do you find a real tennis player walking around with a racket out of its case?” One was short and portly with a mustache.
The other was tall, lean, and
kept glancing at himself in the lobby mirrors.
They had been waiting in the lobby for hours, towels draped, rackets clutched, trying to blend in with the resort atmosphere.
They sat on leather couches in the gleaming atrium, surrounded by business travelers, golf families, and airline crews.
Nobody looked at them twice.
They were background noise in a five-star hotel.
Furniture with a pulse.
Al-Maboo approached the front desk.
He checked in.
He requested a specific kind of room.
No balcony, sealed windows, only one entrance, a room that could not be accessed from outside except through the door.
He was given room 230, second floor.
He had no idea that the two men standing behind him with tennis rackets were about to follow him into the elevator.
The three of them stepped into the lift together.
Al-Maboo pressed two.
The tall tennis player stood beside him, watching the numbers climb, saying nothing.
When the doors opened on the second floor, Al-Maboo stepped out and turned left toward his room.
Behind him, unnoticed, the tall agent followed at a careful distance.
He watched Al-Maboo enter room 230.
He noted the room number.
He noted the room directly across the hallway, room 237.
Then he spoke into a device strapped to his wrist and 6,000 mi away in a command center that Dubai police would later trace to Austria, the information was received.
The target was in room 230.
The staging room would be 237.
Within the hour, a man using the French passport of Peter Elinger booked room 237 from another hotel.
But a different operative, a bald man using the name Kevin Davarong, arrived at the Rotana front desk and checked in to 237 in person.
He took the keys.
Then he handed them off to Gail Foliard, the woman with the Irish passport and what appeared to be a red wig.
She went upstairs.
Three more operatives followed her.
By early evening, seven members of the team were gathered inside room 237, directly across the hall from the man they had come to kill.
They waited.
Al-Maboo, meanwhile, had showered, changed his clothes, put some documents in the room safe, and left the hotel.
It was around 4:30 in the afternoon.
He went out.
Dubai police later determined he went shopping.
He bought sneakers at the Dubai Mall.
He was about to turn 50 in a few weeks.
A weightlifter in his youth, he still walked with the broad shouldered ease of a man who had nothing to fear.
He had survived three assassination attempts.
He had eluded Israeli intelligence for two decades.
He was walking through one of the most glamorous shopping malls in the world, surrounded by tourists and families, browsing past window displays of luxury watches and designer clothing.
buying sneakers.
Outside, the January evening was warm, the kind of dry, pleasant heat that draws millions of visitors to the Gulf every winter.
Fountains glittered in artificial light.
Taxis crawled along Shake Zed Road.
Inside the mall, children ran between stores while their parents carried shopping bags.
It was ordinary, completely perfectly ordinary.
And somewhere in that ordinary crowd, at least three operatives maintained visual contact with the man buying shoes, relaying his movements through encrypted channels, counting down the hours until he would return to his hotel room.
5 hours from that moment, he would be dead.
While Almaboo shopped, the team made their move on room 230.
A lock specialist approached the door with an electronic device designed to reprogram Vingard lock link systems.
the brand used by the Albustan Rotana.
These locks can be accessed and reprogrammed directly at the hotel room door.
The specialist worked quickly.
The hotel’s internal computer system would later show that someone tampered with the lock on room 2:30 at approximately 8:00 that evening.
But something went wrong.
Just as two operatives prepared to enter the room, the elevator at the end of the corridor opened.
A tourist stepped out.
A civilian.
An ordinary hotel guest heading to their room on the same floor.
The agents froze.
One of them, Davern, the bald man, moved to intercept.
He approached the tourist in the hallway, making casual conversation, steering them away from the section near room 230.
Buying time.
Buying seconds.
The entry attempt was aborted.
too risky.
The team retreated to room 237.
They had two options.
Wait for Almaboo to return and ambush him at the door, or use the reprogrammed lock to enter his room now and be waiting inside when he walked in.
They chose the second option, the more dangerous one.
The lock had already been reprogrammed.
They had a working key.
They would let themselves in, close the door, and stand in the dark until the target came back.
Four operatives moved into room 230.
The execution team, they closed the door behind them and stood in the dark.
The second floor of the Albustan Rotana carried on as if nothing had changed.
A room service cart rattled past in the corridor.
Somewhere down the hall, a television murmured through a closed door.
The ice machine at the end of the hallway hummed and clicked.
Guests returned from dinner laughing, swiping their key cards, disappearing into their rooms for the night.
4 m away, behind the door of room 230, four people stood breathing in silence, waiting for a man who did not know they were there.
At 8:24 in the evening, the CCTV cameras in the second floor corridor of the Albustan Rortana captured a man walking slowly down the hallway.
Mahmud Al-Mabu, he paused briefly at the fulllength mirrors along the wall, glancing at his own reflection.
Then he reached room 230.
He slid his key card into the lock.
The green light blinked.
He pushed the door open and stepped inside.
Outside in the corridor, Gail Foliard and Kevin Davern stood watching.
Foliard near the door of room 230.
Daveron a few meters down the hall.
Both monitoring, both ready to intervene if anything went wrong.
Inside room 230, the door closed behind Al-Maboo.
What happened in the next 20 minutes has been reconstructed by Dubai police and forensic investigators, though the exact sequence remains partly classified.
What is known is this.
Al-Maboo was overpowered.
A substance was administered, a fast acting paralytic agent that incapacitates by shutting down voluntary muscle movement.
The body freezes, the mind does not.
According to one account, the substance was delivered through an advanced device using ultrasound waves that could penetrate the skin without leaving a visible mark.
Other sources say a direct injection was used.
The truth may involve both.
What is certain is that the target was likely conscious through at least part of what followed.
He could feel, he could hear, he could not move, he could not scream.
Investigators later found signs of electric shock on several parts of his body, behind his ears, on his legs, over his heart.
Whether this was part of an interrogation or part of the killing method remains debated.
He was then suffocated with a pillow.
Blood was later found on the pillow’s fabric.
According to the forensic findings, there were indications that Almabu tried to resist.
Despite the paralysis, despite the overwhelming odds of four against one, the man who had survived three previous attempts on his life fought back one last time.
His shirt, the one captured on CCTV as he checked in hours earlier, was likely torn in the struggle.
The killers took it with them.
It was not enough.
By 9:00 that evening, Mahmud al-Mabu was dead.
The team worked quickly.
They were trained for this.
They arranged his body on the bed.
They removed his clothing and folded his pants neatly over a chair.
They placed a small bottle of heart medication on the nightstand.
They cleaned the room.
They removed anything that might indicate a struggle.
They checked every surface.
And then they did something that would puzzle investigators for weeks.
They engaged the chain lock on the door from the inside, then left the room.
How they managed to lock a chain from outside a closed door remains one of the operation’s most debated details, but the door was chain locked when hotel security finally opened it the next day.
The scene was designed to tell a simple story.
A middle-aged man with a heart condition had died in his sleep.
Natural causes, nothing to see here.
At 8:46, the CCTV cameras captured the four members of the execution team walking out of room 230.
Calm, unhurried, they walked down the corridor and left the hotel.
Foliard followed one minute later.
Davon followed after her.
By midnight, most of the 26 operatives had left Dubai.
Some flew to Paris, others to Hong Kong, others to South Africa.
They scattered across four continents before doubling back through various routes to destinations unknown.
In Tel Aviv, the news reached Mayor Don.
The director of MSAD reportedly called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with a simple message.
Al-Mabu will not bother us anymore.
There was euphoria, a historic success.
21 years of hunting and the man who had killed Avisoris and Elon Sadon, who had built Hamas’s weapons pipeline from Iran, who had survived three attempts on his life, was finally gone.
But the euphoria was premature because in Dubai, the cameras had seen everything.
The next afternoon, January 20th, a hotel maid knocked on the door of room 230.
No answer.
She knocked again.
Nothing.
She tried the handle.
The door was locked and chained from inside.
Hotel security was called.
They forced the door open.
Inside, they found a man lying on his bed.
No pulse, no breathing.
A bottle of medication on the nightstand.
The room was immaculate.
Spotless.
Too spotless.
The investigators who entered that room were struck by something unusual.
Not by what they found, by what they did not find.
The room was so perfectly clean, so meticulously arranged that it felt staged.
A middle-aged man alone in a hotel room does not die this neatly.
There should have been a glass of water by the bed, a newspaper, a phone, something out of place, something human.
And there was one more thing.
When police reviewed the hotel security camera footage of Al-Maboo checking in the day before, they noticed something.
The shirt he was wearing in the video was nowhere among his belongings.
It was not in the closet, not in the laundry, not anywhere in the room.
Police now believe the killers removed it because it had been torn in the struggle.
A detail so small most people would never notice it.
But the Dubai police noticed.
General Tamim ordered a full investigation.
and what his detectives found.
Buried in hundreds of hours of CCTV footage from the airport, the hotel, shopping malls, and surrounding streets would become one of the most extraordinary pieces of criminal evidence ever assembled.
They compiled 27 minutes of footage, a minute-by-minute visual record of the operation.
They cross-referenced passenger arrival records with hotel guest lists.
They identified suspicious clusters of travelers carrying British, Irish, French, Australian, and German passports who had entered and departed Dubai within the same tight window.
They discovered that many of these same passport holders had made the same trip to Dubai three times in the previous 6 months.
They traced phone calls from disposable cell phones carried by members of the team to four numbers in Austria where a command center had apparently been established.
On February 18th, 2010, General Tamim held a press conference.
He played the footage.
He named 11 suspects.
He displayed their passport photographs.
He said the words that would echo through every intelligence agency in the world.
He was 99% certain, if not 100%, that the assassination was the work of MSAD.
The footage went viral.
The world watched as men and women in tennis outfits, wigs, and tourist clothing moved through a luxury hotel with military precision, following a man to his death.
It was better than any spy film because it was real.
Within days, the investigation expanded.
15 more suspects were identified.
The total reached 26.
12 carried British passports.
Six carried Irish passports.
Four had French documents.
Three used Australian passports.
One had a German passport.
And here was the devastating detail for MSAD.
Seven of the British and Irish passports had been cloned from real people, Israeli citizens with dual nationality, people who were alive and living in Israel, who suddenly found their identities on Interpol’s most wanted list for a murder they had nothing to do with.
One of them, a British-born man named Paul John Keley, appeared on Israeli television, saying the theft of his identity had left him feeling worried, insecure, and angry.
The diplomatic fallout was immediate and severe.
Britain summoned the Israeli ambassador for a 20-minute meeting that accomplished nothing.
The ambassador said he was unable to add additional information.
Ireland demanded an explanation and subsequently expelled an Israeli diplomat.
Australia expelled the head of MSAD station in Canbor.
The European Union’s foreign ministers issued a formal statement strongly condemning the use of forged European passports.
France launched its own investigation after discovering that the MSAD may have run the entire operation from a makeshift command center in a hotel in the Berscie neighborhood of Paris, equipped with computers and secure phones.
Germany arrested a suspected MSAD agent named Yuri Broaddsky at Warsaw airport in June of 2010.
He was wanted under a European arrest warrant for allegedly helping to obtain a German passport for one of the operatives, a man named Michael Bowdenheimer, an American who was entitled to German citizenship through his father.
It was the only passport in the entire operation that was not technically forged.
It was a real German passport obtained through deception and it became the weakest link in the chain.
The United States, according to leaked diplomatic cables released later that year, received a quiet request from Dubai asking for help tracing credit card numbers used by the suspected assassins.
Washington did not cooperate.
The cables also revealed that Dubai had initially considered keeping the entire assassination secret before deciding to go public.
General Tamim publicly requested arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Mossad Chief Mayer Don.
The request was largely symbolic, but the message was clear.
A small Gulf state was publicly accusing one of the world’s most powerful intelligence agencies of murder on its soil.
And it had the footage to prove it.
Interpol placed the photographs and aliases of all 26 suspects on its most wanted list.
And Israel, Israel said nothing.
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman told journalists they watched too many James Bond movies.
Deputy Foreign Minister Danny I alone said there was nothing linking Israel to the assassination.
But in Israel, no one believed the denials.
The media dropped the careful phrase according to foreign reports within the first week.
Military censorship laws initially required the qualifier, but it became a joke.
Editorials debated not whether MSAD was responsible, but whether the operation had been brilliant or sloppy.
Some columnists praised the killing as proof that Israel’s enemies could never feel safe.
Others called for Deon’s resignation for allowing such a catastrophic exposure.
The newspaper Haritz ran a scathing analysis, arguing that even if the operation had gone perfectly, its strategic value was questionable.
Mahmood’s place would be taken by Muhammad.
The columnist wrote, “The pipeline would be rebuilt and the next man might be harder to find.
” There was also an uncomfortable irony that Israeli commentators were quick to note.
The operation was designed to create paranoia within Hamas to make them wonder who among them had betrayed Al-Maboo’s travel plans.
And it worked.
Hamas launched an internal investigation.
Trust within the organization was shattered.
Two former FATA security officers in Dubai were arrested by police as possible accompllices.
Suspicion fell everywhere.
But the paranoia came at a price no one had anticipated.
The entire world now knew exactly how MSAD operated.
The disguises, the passport methods, the electronic lock devices, the communication protocols, the team structure, the staging rooms, everything.
The operation that was meant to be invisible had become the most documented, most analyzed, most publicly dissected intelligence operation in modern history.
Every disguise change, every elevator ride, every hallway conversation, all on camera.
And yet, here is the part that perhaps matters most.
Not one of the 26 suspects was ever caught.
Not one was ever arrested.
Not one was ever brought to trial.
They vanished.
All of them into the same shadows from which they had emerged.
Al-Maboo’s body was flown back to Damascus.
Hamas initially tried to control the narrative.
The day after his death, the Alcasam brigades issued a statement claiming their commander had died of cancer in a hospital in the United Arab Emirates.
It was a lie and a clumsy one.
Within days, Hamas Deputy Pullet Bureau Chief Musa Abu Marzuk reversed course and publicly blamed MSAD.
Al-Mabu’s brother, Fik spoke to journalists from Gaza, revealing that Makmoud had told the family very little about his work over the years.
But he confirmed the three previous assassination attempts and added a detail that underscored just how relentlessly Israel had pursued his brother.
The family’s home in the Jabalia camp had been demolished by the Israeli military back in 1989, shortly after Makmoud’s escape from Gaza.
A neighbor told reporters, “We knew he was the one behind the killing of an Israeli soldier.
” Back in Israel, the families of Ai Sasporas and Elon Sadon received the news differently.
The Sasporas family declined public comment, but thanked the security forces.
Elon Sadd’s mother, Gilbert, was less measured.
She told reporters she was furious.
For years, she had been told that everyone responsible for her son’s kidnapping and murder had already been dealt with.
Now, she learned that the chief architect had been alive and free in Damascus.
All along, Hamas publicly mourned their weapons chief.
His military wing declared him one of the founders of the Alcasam brigades, and acknowledged his role in the 1989 soldier kidnappings.
They swore revenge.
In their eulogy, they described him as a man who had been martyed while serving the cause.
They released the Alazer interview in which he had confessed on camera to killing the soldiers while dressed as an Orthodox Jew.
It was perhaps unintentionally the most damning testimony of his own past that anyone could have asked for.
Four years later, during the 2014 conflict in Gaza, Al-Maboo’s nephew, Ahmad, who had followed his uncle into Hamas and become a combat engineering and explosives officer, was killed in an Israeli targeted operation.
The family’s war with Israel did not end in room 230.
And the broader question that General Tamim’s investigation posed to the world of intelligence remains unanswered to this day.
In an age when cameras watch everything, when facial recognition is everywhere, when digital footprints cannot be erased, can a covert operation of this scale remain covert? MSAD accomplished what it set out to do.
The man who kidnapped and killed two Israeli soldiers in 1989, who built the weapons pipeline that armed Hamas with Iranian rockets, who had evaded justice for 21 years, was dead.
But the cost was staggering.
methods exposed, agents identified, alliances damaged, and an organization that prides itself on operating in absolute darkness dragged into the light.
And yet, not one of the 26 suspects was ever caught, not one arrested, not one brought to trial.
They vanished into the same shadows from which they had emerged.
If you had been meer don sitting in that conference room on January 15th, 2010, knowing the cameras would be watching, knowing the passports were recycled, knowing the risk, would you have given the order, or would you have waited for a better chance that might never come? Drop your answer in the comments.
Al-Mabu once said in that final Alazer interview filmed just weeks before his death that he had always been cautious.
That caution had kept him alive for 21 years.
Three attempts, three survivals.
He believed he could feel danger coming.
On January 19th, 2010, at 8:24 in the evening, he walked down a quiet hotel corridor, glanced at himself in the mirror, and opened the door to room 230.
He did not feel it coming.
The door closed behind him.
The lock clicked shut.
