How Mossad Saved Hostages Seconds Before Their Execution
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If that was true, hitting the warehouse early would scatter the captors and make the hostages harder to find.
Galand overruled her.
His assessment was that waiting increased risk more than it reduced uncertainty.
At 11:20 pm, the team moved to breach.
The entry plan assumed a hydraulic loading bay door.
When they reached it, they discovered it was manual with an internal drop bar.
The hydraulic spreader couldn’t generate enough force without excessive noise.
They switched to a thermal lance, a cutting tool that burns through steel using oxygen-fed metal rods.
It worked, but it took 4 minutes instead of 90 seconds.
By the time they entered the building, anyone inside had heard them coming.
The main floor was empty.
No hostages, no captors, just textile machinery and abandoned shipping crates.
Galon’s immediate thought was that they’d breached the wrong building within the complex.
Then one of the surveillance specialists found the stairwell leading down.
The basement wasn’t on any architectural records.
It was roughly 200 m divided into three rooms.
The first contained a desk, a shortwave radio, and scattered documents in Arabic and Spanish.
The second had sleeping mats and personal effects evidence that multiple people had staged there over days or weeks.
The third room had seven chairs.
Four were overturned.
Two showed plastic zip tie residue on the armrests, but no hostages, no captors, no indication of where they’d gone.
Galand radioed the perimeter team.
Had any vehicles exited in the last 10 minutes? No.
Which meant either the hostages had never been there or they’d been moved hours before the team arrived.
Iban examined the documents in the first room.
Most were logistical supply orders, vehicle rentals, but one was handwritten in Arabic.
She translated aloud, “Transfer complete.
Proceed to secondary.
” Confirmed by 22 Zahu.
It was 11:31 pm The note was 3 and 1/2 hours old.
The signals officer reported encrypted radio traffic on a known Hezbollah frequency within the last hour.
He couldn’t break it without more time.
Galant stared at the overturned chairs.
One of them had blood on the leg, not enough to suggest a killing, but enough to indicate violence.
Someone asked the obvious question.
If the hostages had been moved hours ago, where did that leave the execution timeline? Goland didn’t answer.
He was deciding whether to extract the team and report failure or assume the operation was still live and commit to an uncertain pursuit.
If he was wrong, he’d waste critical hours chasing ghosts.
If he was right and did nothing, seven people would die while his team stood in an empty room.
He made the call to continue, but he didn’t tell Tel Aviv the warehouse was empty.
The documents recovered from the warehouse included a rental agreement for a property in Lis Damora, a district 12 km west.
The agreement was dated March 8th, the same day the first hostage disappeared.
Eban argued this was the more likely holding site.
Goland agreed, but with a critical gap.
They had no floor plan, no surveillance data, and no confirmation anyone was actually there.
The signals officer flagged an intercepted radio transmission at 11:52 pm brief in Arabic.
The phrase the western site was mentioned once.
That was all Galant needed.
He ordered the team to move.
They reached Lis Desamora at 12:40 am The property was a two-story residential building set back from the road, partially hidden by overgrown vegetation.
Lights were on and two upstairs windows.
A white Ford pickup sat in the driveway consistent with vehicle descriptions from one of the abduction reports.
Thermal imaging showed at least nine heat signatures inside.
Golant’s initial assessment, seven hostages, two captors.
But the signatures weren’t moving.
They were clustered in a single ground floor room that didn’t match a holding pattern.
It matched a staging.
Iban said it aloud first.
If the hostages were positioned in one room with captors standing over them, a loud breach would likely trigger an immediate execution.
She recommended attempting contact first using a loudspeaker to establish communication and buy time for a quieter entry.
Goland rejected it.
His read was that any delay increased the chance they’d arrived too late.
If everyone was in one room, they were accessible in a single entry.
Speed would save them.
Hesitation would kill them.
But one of the extraction specialists disagreed.
He pointed out that they had no intelligence on how many captors were actually inside.
Nine heat signatures could mean two hostages were already dead and seven capttors were waiting.
or it could mean three capttors and six hostages.
The thermal data couldn’t distinguish.
Galant asked him what he recommended.
The operatives said, “We abort.
Get real surveillance.
Come back in 6 hours with actual information.
” Iban agreed.
She said the blood on the chair in the warehouse could mean they’d already lost someone.
Rushing a second breach, based on another assumption, could mean losing everyone.
Goland stood outside the building for 40 seconds without speaking.
His team was splitting.
Half wanted to abort.
Half wanted to move.
The intelligence had been wrong once.
It could be wrong again.
But if it wasn’t, if seven people were inside that building waiting for a bullet, then walking away meant living with a decision he couldn’t reverse.
He gave the order to breach.
At 10:03 am, the team hit the front door with a battering ram.
The frame splintered in one strike.
They entered in tactical formation, weapons raised, prepared for immediate resistance.
They found seven people sitting on the floor, hands bound behind their backs, black hoods over their heads, two men standing behind them, arms at their sides.
But the men weren’t holding weapons to anyone’s head.
They were just standing there.
The two capttors raised their hands immediately.
No defensive posture, no attempt to reach for sidearms.
One of them said in broken English, “We were told you would come.
” Galant ordered them restrained and searched.
They were carrying handguns and hip holsters, but neither had drawn.
On the floor beside one of the hostages was a video camera on a tripod pointed directly at the group.
The camera was off, but the battery was fully charged.
The record light had tape over it.
Ibon removed the hoods from the hostages one by one.
All seven were conscious, disoriented, but physically unharmed.
No visible signs of beating.
No evidence of interrogation.
When she asked how long they’d been in that room, one of them said maybe 2 hours.
They moved us here from somewhere else.
Galant asked the captors when the execution was scheduled.
One of them looked genuinely confused.
He responded in Spanish.
There was no execution.
We were hired to hold them until someone arrived.
Galant separated the two captors and interrogated them individually.
Their stories matched.
Both were Argentine nationals.
Neither had direct Hezbollah affiliation.
They’d been contracted through an intermediary to secure and transport seven individuals to this location and wait for further instructions.
They were paid $3,000 each in US currency.
They didn’t know who the hostages were or why they’d been taken.
When pressed on who gave the orders, one of them provided a phone number and a first name, Hassan.
The number was traced within 30 minutes.
It belonged to a prepaid mobile phone registered in Brazil.
The phone had been used exactly twice in the last 72 hours.
Once to coordinate the rental agreement, once to send a text message to a Beirutbased number.
The text read, “Package delivered.
Ready for collection.
” Mossad’s signals division identified the Beirut number immediately.
It belonged to Fadim Majad, a mid-level Hezbollah logistics coordinator.
But Majed wasn’t an operational planner.
His role was administrative, resource allocation, budgeting, personnel scheduling.
He wasn’t the kind of operative who planned hostage executions.
Haban asked Galen to consider a different interpretation of the evidence.
Seven Israelis taken over 72 hours, held at two separate locations, moved deliberately but not covertly.
No interrogation, no ransom demand, no public statement, and captives who seemed to be waiting for something rather than preparing for something.
She said, “What if this wasn’t an execution? What if it was bait?” Galant asked what she meant.
Eban laid it out.
If Hezbollah wanted to understand how Mossad responds to hostage scenarios on Argentine soil, the most effective method would be to create one.
Leak credible intelligence, establish a tight timeline, force a rapid operational response, then observe team composition, vehicle types, entry tactics, response protocols, decision-making under pressure.
All of it documented in real time.
Goland said, “Why burn resources on surveillance when you can just kill seven Israelis and claim it as a victory?” Aban replied, “Because dead hostages give you one news cycle.
” A failed rescue gives you operational intelligence you can use for years, and a successful rescue gives you even more because you get to watch how they operate when they think they’ve won.
Then the signals officer interrupted.
He’d just intercepted another encrypted transmission on the same Hezbollah frequency they’d been monitoring.
The signal strength suggested it had originated within a 3 km radius of their current location.
Someone was watching them right now.
Galant made an immediate decision.
Evacuate.
No secondary sweep of the building.
No attempt to locate the nearby transmitter.
If this was a surveillance operation, every additional minute on site was feeding intelligence to the other side.
The team extracted all personnel and hostages by 1:47 am They reached the Buenosire safe house at 2:35 am All seven hostages were alive.
The mission, by any tactical measure, had succeeded.
But as Galant sat in the safe house reviewing the night’s events, one detail kept circling back.
The video camera fully charged, pointed at the hostages, tape over the record light.
If it had been set up to film an execution, why wasn’t it recording when they arrived? Unless it wasn’t meant to film the hostages at all.
At 3:15 am, Gallant debriefed each of the seven hostages individually.
Their accounts were consistent on the basic facts.
Abducted by force at different times and locations, transported separately in panel vans, held in isolation for 12 to 36 hours, then moved together to the final location approximately 3 hours before the rescue.
But one hostage, a 34year-old engineer from Hifa named David Misrai, mentioned something no one else had noticed.
While being transported in the van, he’d been seated near the front.
The capttors were speaking to each other in Arabic.
He didn’t understand most of it, but his grandfather had been Moroccan, and he recognized one phrase, al-istidad, al-Cas.
Iban translated it immediately, special preparation.
It was Hezbollah, operational shorthand.
She’d heard it twice before in intercepts.
Both times it referred to surveillance exercises.
Galant asked Ms.
Rahi if he was certain about the phrase.
Misrai said yes.
He’d repeated it silently to himself multiple times to make sure he remembered it correctly.
At 4:12 am, Golant sent an encrypted report to Tel Aviv.
He confirmed all seven hostages were safe.
He also flagged the surveillance theory and recommended the team remain in Buenosire to assess operational exposure.
The response came back 28 minutes later.
Leadership acknowledged the successful extraction, but expressed concern about the intelligence gaps.
They authorized a 72-hour assessment period.
During that window, the team was to conduct counter surveillance sweeps and determine whether their operational profile had been compromised.
Galant assigned two surveillance specialists to begin monitoring Israeli linked sites across Buenos’s synagogues, the embassy district, community centers.
If Hezbollah had been observing the rescue, they’d likely maintain observation on related targets.
Heban told him she thought he was underestimating the scope.
She said if this had been designed as a surveillance operation, Hezbollah wouldn’t just watch the rescue itself.
They’d watch the aftermath, how the team moved post operation, where they staged, how they communicated with Tel Aviv, whether they changed protocols after realizing they’d been observed.
Goland asked her what she recommended.
She said, “Assume everything we did tonight was recorded.
assume they know our faces, our vehicles, our entry methods, and assume they’re still watching.
He asked if she thought they should extract immediately get the hostages out of Argentina within 24 hours and dissolve the team.
She said yes, but she also said it might already be too late.
On March 11th, at 9:30 am, one of the surveillance specialists reported activity at the AMIA building, the Jewish Community Center in central Buenosiris.
A man matching the description of a known Hezbollah affiliate had been observed conducting what appeared to be a photographic survey of the building’s perimeter.
He’d spent 11 minutes walking the block, stopping at three different angles, holding a camera but not obviously taking pictures.
Galand ordered the operative to maintain distant observation but not to engage.
If this was part of the surveillance network, confronting him would only confirm that Mossad knew they were being watched.
At 11:05 am, a second sighting.
Different individual, same behavior.
This time outside a synagogue in the Belgrano district.
The man spent 8 minutes examining entry points and sight lines.
Golland called an emergency team meeting.
He told them the working theory was no longer theoretical.
It was confirmed.
Hezbollah had used the hostage scenario to draw out an operational response and they were now conducting follow-up reconnaissance on Jewish targets across the city.
One of the extraction specialists asked the obvious question.
Should they engage? If Hezbollah was actively surveilling sites, that meant they were planning something.
Observing without acting meant allowing preparation for a future attack.
Galant faced the same decision structure he’d faced 12 hours earlier.
Act on incomplete information or wait for clarity that might come too late.
Eban argued for immediate engagement.
She said if they had the visual confirmation of Hezbollah operatives conducting site surveys, that was enough.
Detain them, interrogate them, break the operational chain before it progressed.
But Golant hesitated.
If they detained the operatives, Hezbollah would know their surveillance had been detected.
That would burn whatever residual intelligence value remained in the operation.
It would also confirm that Mossad had a functional presence in Buenosire, something that up until the previous night may not have been certain.
He decided to continue observation without engagement.
He told the team they would document the surveillance activity, identify as many operatives as possible, and pass the intelligence to Argentine authorities for action.
Iben asked him if he trusted Argentine authorities to act on it.
He didn’t answer.
At 2:40 pm, the signals officer reported another intercepted transmission.
This one was longer, nearly 90 seconds, still encrypted, but the traffic pattern suggested coordination between multiple parties.
The transmission originated from somewhere in central Buenosiris.
It was followed 6 minutes later by a response transmission from a location approximately 18 km south.
Galant asked if there was any way to decrypt it.
The signals officer said not without bringing in additional resources from Tel Aviv, which would take at least 48 hours.
By 6L pm on March 11th, the surveillance team had >> >> identified three separate individuals conducting reconnaissance at four different Jewish sites across Buenosiris.
All three matched known profiles in Mossad’s Hezbollah database.
None of them appeared to be communicating with each other directly, which suggested compartmentalized tasking.
Galant updated Tel Aviv with the findings.
The response was unambiguous.
Do not engage.
Document and monitor only.
The Israeli government did not want a confrontation on Argentine soil that could escalate into a diplomatic incident.
On March 12th, the reconnaissance activity stopped.
No further sightings, no additional transmissions.
The three identified operatives vanished from observable patterns.
Galant interpreted this as a positive sign.
He believed the surveillance phase had concluded and Hezbollah had moved to operational planning elsewhere, likely outside Argentina.
Iban disagreed.
She said the sudden sessation of visible activity didn’t mean the operation had ended.
It meant it had moved to a phase where visibility was no longer necessary.
She told Galant that everything Hezbollah needed to know, they now knew.
On March 13th, Galant received authorization to extract the team.
All seven hostages were relocated to safe transit points and returned to Israel over the following 48 hours.
The operation was classified as a tactical success.
Internal reviews noted the intelligence failures but praised the decision-making under uncertainty.
Galant filed his final report on March the 16th.
In it, he acknowledged the surveillance theory but stated that without direct evidence of compromised protocols, he couldn’t conclusively determine operational exposure.
Four months later, the evidence arrived.
On July 18th, 1994, four months and 5 days after Operation Baram Knight, a Renault traffic van packed with approximately 275 kg of ammonium nitrate explosives detonated outside the AMA Jewish Community Center in Buenosiris.
The blast occurred at 9:53 am during morning activities.
85 people were killed, more than 300 were injured.
The sevenstory building partially collapsed.
It remains the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentine history.
Argentine intelligence spent two years investigating the bombing.
In 1996, a sealed report was shared with Israeli officials.
The report concluded that while Hezbollah had been planning an attack on Jewish targets in Buenosaris since late 1993, the tactical execution timing, target selection, entry route analysis, and security gap exploitation showed evidence of updated intelligence gathered in early 1994.
Specifically, the attackers had known three things that weren’t publicly available.
The AMI building’s perimeter security operated on a rotating schedule with a 7-minute gap during shift changes.
Israeli security personnel in Buenosire prioritized embassy sites over community centers and MOSAD’s emergency response protocol involved delayed perimeter sweeps to avoid the compromising surveillance positions.
All three of those operational details had been observable during the march hostage rescue.
Mossad’s internal review began in August 1994.
The inquiry was led by a senior operations officer who had not been involved in Baramnite.
He interviewed all eight team members individually.
He reviewed every decision point, every communication with Tel Aviv, every intercept, every surveillance log.
His conclusion delivered in a classified brief in November 1994 was direct.
The march operation had provided Hezbollah with a real-time case study in Israeli counterterrors.
The hostage scenario had been designed not to kill seven people, but to force an operational exposure that could be analyzed and exploited.
The review noted that Golant’s decision to proceed despite incomplete intelligence was tactically sound.
The hostages were real.
The threat was credible.
Waiting for perfect information would have meant waiting too long.
But the review also noted that the decision to continue surveillance after the rescue rather than immediately extracting had extended the observation window.
Every hour the team remained in Buenosire after March 10th was an hour Hezbollah could study how MSAD operated in a post crisis environment.
Galant was not reprimanded.
He was reassigned.
He continued running operations in South America until 1998, but no longer encountered terror.
His role shifted to economic intelligence, monitoring financial networks, tracking money flows, liaison work with banking regulators.
In a closed door testimony in 1999, he was asked whether he would have acted differently if he’d known the rescue was being observed.
His answer was no.
He said the hostages were real.
The threat was credible.
The alternative was to let seven people die while waiting for certainty that would never come.
He was then asked if he believed the AMA bombing could have been prevented.
He said he didn’t know, but he acknowledged that the intelligence Hezbollah gained in March made the July attack easier to execute.
Aban left field operations in late 1994.
She transitioned to analysis and training, working primarily out of Tel Aviv.
In 2003, she gave one of the only interviews she ever granted to an Israeli defense journal on condition of anonymity.
She was asked what the hardest part of intelligence work was.
She said, “Making a decision that saves lives in front of you and costs lives you’ll never see.
” She was asked if she thought Operation Baram Knight was a success or a failure.
She said it was both and that most operations are.
The seven hostages returned to Israel in March 1994.
None of them were told about the surveillance theory.
None were informed that their rescue may have provided intelligence that enabled a future attack.
Most of them learned about the AMIA bombing from news reports 4 months later and had no reason to connect it to their own abduction.
One of them, David Misrai, the engineer who had recognized the Arabic phrase later said in an interview that he never understood why he’d been taken.
He said the men who held him didn’t ask questions, didn’t make demands, just moved him from one location to another and waited.
He said it felt less like a kidnapping and more like a rehearsal.
Hezbollah never claimed responsibility for the AMA bombing.
Argentine prosecutors issued arrest warrants for several high-ranking Hezbollah officials, but none were ever extradited.
In 2006, Argentine and Israeli intelligence agencies concluded jointly that the attack had been ordered by Iran and executed by Hezbollah with logistical support from Iranian diplomatic personnel in Buenosire.
Mossad never publicly acknowledged operation Baram Knight.
The connection between the March rescue and the July bombing remains officially unconfirmed, but after 1994, Israeli intelligence protocols in South America changed.
Response times were shortened.
Surveillance windows were compressed and hostage scenarios were treated not just as rescue opportunities, but as potential collection operations designed to study the people responding.
The operation saved seven lives.
But what it revealed may have cost dozens more.
And the people who made those decisions understood long before the bomb detonated that success and failure aren’t always separable.
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