At 0600 on January 24th, 1943, Lieutenant Commander Dudley Morton stood in the cramped conning tower of USS Wahoo, watching Japanese destroyer Harus swing toward his submarine at 12 knots, tracking his position with deadly precision inside Wiiwac Harbor.
35 years old, two patrols as prospective commanding officer.
Zero ships sunk under his command.
The Imperial Japanese Navy had stationed Harus and three submarines at Wiiwax specifically to protect the supply base that fed Japan’s operations across New Guinea.
Until December 31st, 1942, American submarines avoided close-range destroyer attacks.
A destroyer could reach 35 knots.
A submerged submarine struggled to make nine.
Standard doctrine called for evasion, diving deep, rigging for silent running.
Every submarine commander in the Pacific Fleet knew the numbers.
Between December 1941 and December 1942, Japanese destroyers had depth charged 23 American submarines.
15 survived, eight didn’t.
Morton changed that doctrine before he even took command.
On December 10th, during Wahoo’s second patrol, he watched the previous captain, Lieutenant Commander Marvin Kennedy, refused to attack a damaged convoy after one depth charge run.
Two cargo ships, one destroyer.
All three escaped.
Morton and executive officer Richard O’Ne stood in the Conning tower, watching opportunity sail away.
Kennedy was 38 years old, experienced, cautious.
Morton was 35, aggressive, furious.
3 weeks later, Morton relieved Kennedy as commanding officer.
Before Wahoo departed Brisbane on January 16th for her third patrol, Morton assembled the crew on deck.
He told them Wahoo was expendable.
They would take reasonable precautions, but their mission was to sink enemy shipping.
Anyone who wanted to transfer could see the Yman within 30 minutes.
No negative words would be said about anyone who stayed behind.
Morton gave the yman verbal authority to process transfers immediately.
Morton waited 30 minutes.
Not one sailor requested transfer.
Zero.
Wahoo was the worst performing submarine in the Pacific Fleet.
Two patrols, two failures, one damaged tanker.
Kennedy’s overcautious tactics had demoralized the crew.
Morton promised them something different.
Aggressive attacks.
Surface running at night.
Maximum speed.
hunt the enemy instead of hiding from them.
Five days later, Wahoo received orders to reconoid Wiiwac, a Japanese supply base on the north coast of New Guinea.
There was one problem.
The US Navy had no charts of Weiwac Harbor.
None.
Zero hydrographic surveys, no depth soundings, no navigation references.
Motor machinist mate Daltton Keer had bought a cheap school atlas in Australia.
It showed a small indentation labeled Wiiwac.
That was Morton’s chart.
a school atlas that cost $2.
Morton interpreted reconoider as enter and destroy.
On January 24th at0530, Wahoo submerged and crept into Weiwack Harbor at periscope depth.
Morton positioned Okaane at the attack periscope while he analyzed the tactical situation.
This violated standard procedure.
Captains always mann the periscope during attacks.
Morton didn’t care about standard procedure.
At 0600, Okaane spotted Harusame anchored between two submarines, a destroyer, 1,250 tons, four 5-in guns, eight depth charge racks built specifically to kill submarines.
Morton fired three torpedoes from,200 yd.
All three missed.
The torpedo wakes gave away Wahoo’s position immediately.
Herame’s crew scrambled to battle stations.
The destroyer’s engines roared to life.
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Morton watched Harame accelerate toward Wahoo’s position.
800 yd 600.
The destroyer’s bow wave grew larger through the periscope.
Japanese sailors lined the deck, pointing at the periscope wake.
Morton fired a fourth torpedo.
Miss Harame close to 400 yd.
Every man in Wahoo’s conning tower knew what was coming.
Depth charges.
Ramming both.
Morton had one torpedo remaining in the forward tubes.
One shot and a Japanese destroyer bearing down on his position at flank speed with exactly 45 seconds until collision.
Morton ordered the last torpedo fired at 800 yd down the throat straight at the destroyer’s bow.
The tactic was theoretical, never tried in combat.
Every submarine officer in the Pacific knew about it.
Fire torpedoes directly at an attacking warship’s bow, then dive beneath her keel before impact.
If the torpedo missed, the destroyer would ram you or drop depth charges directly on your position.
If you dove too late, same result.
Nobody had survived testing the theory.
The torpedo left Wahoo’s tube at 46 knots.
Travel time to target 39 seconds.
Morton ordered emergency dive.
Wahoo’s bow dropped at maximum angle, 300 ft.
Harusame passed directly overhead.
Wahoo’s crew heard the destroyer’s propellers churning through the water.
Then silence.
Then an explosion so massive it lifted Wahoo’s stern 12 ft before slamming back down.
Light fixtures shattered.
Cork insulation rained from the overhead.
Men grabbed handholds.
Morton brought Wahoo to periscope depth 90 seconds later.
Where Harame had been, he saw debris and an expanding oil slick.
The destroyer had broken in half.
Both sections were sinking.
Morton had just accomplished what every submarine commander in the Pacific thought was suicide.
He fired a torpedo at an attacking destroyer from point blank range and it worked.
Wahoo withdrew from Weiwac Harbor at maximum speed.
Morton had proven aggressive tactics could sink destroyers, but he’d also expended five torpedoes to sink one ship.
Wahoo carried 24 torpedoes total.
Five gone, 19 remaining.
Morton needed to make every shot count.
2 days later on January 26th at 07:15 Wahoo’s lookouts spotted smoke on the horizon north of New Guinea.
Morton surfaced and gave chase at maximum speed.
By 0930, Wahoo had closed to visual range.
Five ships, two freighters, one large transport, one tanker, one escort.
The convoy was moving at 8 knots, zigzagging on a predictable pattern.
Morton tracked the convoy for 6 hours, analyzing their movements, calculating firing solutions.
Standard doctrine called for submerged attacks.
Fire torpedoes, dive deep, evade counterattack.
Morton had a different plan.
He would attack on the surface at night.
Close the range, fire multiple spreads, sink everything.
At 1500 hours, Morton submerged to attack position.
He positioned Wahoo directly in the convoy’s path and waited.
At 1720, the lead freighter, Fuku Maru, came into range.
Morton fired two torpedoes from 1,500 yd.
Both hit.
Fuku Maru began sinking immediately.
Morton swung Wahu’s bow toward the second freighter and fired one torpedo.
hit.
The freighter slowed but remained afloat.
Then Morton spotted the transport Buyaru, 8,000 tons, loaded with troops and supplies, the largest target in the convoy.
Morton fired three torpedoes.
The second and third struck Buyaru amid ships.
The ship went dead in the water, wounded, not sinking.
Morton fired two more torpedoes at the damaged second freighter which was attempting to ram Wahoo.
Both torpedoes hit.
The freighter exploded.
Morton turned his attention back to Buuomaru.
The transport was still afloat.
Troops were abandoning ship, climbing into lifeboats.
Morton surfaced to finish the job with deck guns.
What happened next would become the most controversial action of Morton’s career and the reason he would never receive the Medal of Honor despite sinking 19 ships.
Wahoo’s crew opened fire on the lifeboats with machine guns and the 4-in deck gun for 90 minutes.
Morton directed fire on the survivors.
His reasoning was clear.
Every Japanese soldier who reached shore was a soldier who would kill American troops later.
Better to stop them now.
But the HEG convention of 1907 prohibited attacking shipwreck survivors under any circumstances.
The attack killed approximately 87 Japanese soldiers and 195 Indian prisoners of war who had been aboard Buu Maru.
Morton didn’t know the Indians were prisoners.
He thought they were Japanese troops.
By the time Wahu’s crew realized their mistake, it was too late.
The lifeboats were destroyed.
The survivors were in the water.
Morton broke off the attack and withdrew.
Wahoo had expended 17 torpedoes in two days, seven remaining.
But Morton had sunk four confirmed ships, one destroyer, three cargo vessels, more than any American submarine had accomplished in a single patrol, and he still had time to find more targets before returning to base.
On February 7th, 1943, Wahoo surfaced 3 mi off Pearl Harbor.
Before entering the naval base, Morton ordered the crew topside.
They lashed a straw broom to the periscope shears.
Clean sweep.
From the signal howiard, eight small Japanese flags fluttered in the wind.
One flag for each ship Wahoo claimed sunk.
When Wahoo tied up at the pier, Admiral Chester Nimitz was waiting.
Nimttz came aboard personally.
He presented Morton with a Navy cross.
The citation credited Wahoo with sinking eight enemy ships totaling 32,000 tons in 23 days.
It was the most successful patrol in Pacific submarine force history.
Morton’s aggressive tactics had proven what every cautious commander thought was impossible.
attack on the surface, charge destroyers, hunt convoys.
It worked.
Morton’s patrol reports spread through the submarine force within days.
Every commanding officer read it.
Some called Morton reckless.
Others called him brilliant.
Admiral Charles Lockwood, Commander Submarine Force Pacific, called him exactly what the fleet needed.
Lockwood ordered Morton to brief every submarine captain at Pearl Harbor on his tactics.
Morton spent two weeks explaining his approach.
Position the executive officer at the periscope.
Captain analyzes the overall tactical situation.
Make decisions faster.
Attack more aggressively.
Don’t wait for perfect firing solutions.
Close the range.
Make every torpedo count.
On February 23rd, Wahoo departed for her fourth patrol.
Destination, Yellow Sea, Northern Waters off Korea.
No American submarine had operated there before.
The area was shallow, heavily patrolled, close to Japanese air bases, perfect hunting grounds for Morton’s tactics.
Wahoo topped off at Midway on February 27th and continued northwest.
On March 19th, Wahoo cighted a 5,000 ton freighter, Zogan Maru, steaming south along the Korean coast.
Morton fired one torpedo from 1,800 yd.
Hit the freighter sank in 7 minutes.
4 hours later, Morton attacked another freighter, Kamaru.
The first torpedo malfunctioned.
Kamaru began evasive maneuvers.
Morton fired a second torpedo.
Miss.
The freighter escaped.
Two days later, off the coast of Korea, Morton spotted two more freighters traveling together.
Hosen Maru and Nitsu Maru, both loaded with cargo, heading for Japan.
Morton closed to 12,200 yd and fired three torpedoes.
Two hit Jose Maru.
The ship exploded and sank.
Morton immediately swung Wahu’s bow toward Nitsumaru and fired two more torpedoes.
Both hit.
Nitsumaru went down stern first.
Morton spent the next week hunting in the Yellow Sea.
He sank three more confirmed ships.
Patrol boats, fishing twers, anything flying the Japanese flag.
Wahoo operated almost entirely on the surface, diving only when aircraft appeared.
Morton’s lookout spotted planes minutes before they arrived.
Wahoo could crash dive in 45 seconds.
It was enough time.
By March 25th, Wahoo had expended all 24 torpedoes.
Morton had sunk se Morton’s answer surprised everyone.
The Sea of Japan, the most dangerous waters in the Pacific, completely enclosed by enemy territory.
Only two narrow straits for entry and exit.
Both heavily mined, both constantly patrolled.
No American submarine had successfully penetrated the Sea of Japan and returned.
None.
Morton requested permission to try.
Lockwood denied it.
Too dangerous.
Too many unknowns.
Not enough intelligence on Japanese defenses.
Morton would have to wait.
Wahoo underwent refit at Mayor Island Navyyard from May 29th through July 20th, 1943.
New equipment, fresh paint, full torpedo load.
During refit, Morton received orders for his fifth patrol.
Return to the Yellow Sea.
Attack shipping lanes between Korea and Japan.
Standard patrol.
Same area Morton had dominated on his fourth patrol.
Morton departed Pearl Harbor on August 2nd.
Wahoo topped off at Midway on August 5th and continued northwest.
By August 9th, Wahoo had reached the patrol area.
Morton spent 2 days searching for targets.
Nothing.
The Japanese had rerouted their convoys after Morton’s previous devastation.
Shipping lanes that once carried dozens of freighters per week were empty.
On August 11th, Morton spotted a single cargo ship hugging the Korean coast.
He closed to 800 yd and fired two torpedoes.
Both hit.
The ship sank.
Morton continued hunting.
For 8 days, he found nothing.
Empty ocean, clear skies, zero targets.
The Japanese had learned they weren’t sending ships through waters where Morton operated.
On August 19th, Morton made a decision that would define the rest of his career.
He radioed Admiral Lockwood with a request.
Permission to enter the Sea of Japan through La Peru Strait.
Lockwood’s reply came back within hours.
Permission granted.
Proceed with extreme caution.
Report position daily.
Good hunting.
Morton brought Wahoo to the surface and turned north.
La Peru Strait separated the northern tip of Japan’s Hokkaido Island from Russia’s Sakalin Island.
The strait was 25 mi wide at its narrowest point.
Japanese patrol boats covered it constantly.
Minefields blocked the most direct routes.
Submarines attempting passage had to navigate on the surface at night, submerged during day, and hope Japanese radar didn’t detect them.
Wahoo entered La Peru Straight on the night of August 20th at 2200 hours.
Morton ran on the surface at maximum speed.
Lookout spotted three patrol boats within the first hour.
Morton evaded all three by changing course and diving briefly.
By 0400 on August 21st, Wahoo had cleared the straight.
She was inside the Sea of Japan, the first American submarine to successfully penetrate Japanese home waters.
For the next 10 days, Morton hunted Japanese shipping with methodical precision.
He sank two cargo ships on August 22nd, one tanker on August 24th, three freighters on August 26th.
But problems emerged.
Wahoo’s torpedoes were malfunctioning.
The Mark1 torpedo had plagued American submarines since December 1941.
Magnetic exploders failed.
Depth settings were wrong.
Contact exploders didn’t detonate.
Morton fired 16 torpedoes during the patrol.
Only seven functioned properly.
On September 1st, Morton attacked a four ship convoy protected by two destroyers.
He fired six torpedoes.
Two hit.
One freighter sank.
The other four torpedoes either missed or failed to explode.
The destroyers counterattacked immediately.
Wahoo dove to 300 ft and rigged for silent running.
Depth charges exploded overhead for 2 hours.
None close enough to cause serious damage.
Morton waited until the destroyers withdrew, then surfaced and continued hunting.
By September 5th, Wahoo had expended all 24 torpedoes.
Morton claimed 13 ships sunk.
Post patrol analysis credited him with five confirmed.
The discrepancy frustrated Morton.
He knew his tactics worked.
He knew his crew was executing perfectly.
The torpedoes were failing them.
Morton withdrew from the Sea of Japan through La Peru Strait on September 7th.
He arrived at Pearl Harbor on September 17th.
Admiral Lockwood met him at the pier.
The debrief took 6 hours.
Morton documented every torpedo malfunction, every failure, every missed opportunity.
Lockwood forwarded Morton’s report to the Bureau of Ordinance with strong recommendations.
Fix the torpedoes immediately.
But Morton wouldn’t wait for fixes.
He wanted to return to the Sea of Japan, prove his tactics worked, sink more ships than any submarine commander in history.
Lach would approve the mission.
Wahoo would depart for her seventh patrol in 2 weeks.
And this time, Morton wouldn’t be coming back.
On September 9th, 1943, Wahoo departed Pearl Harbor for her seventh war patrol.
Executive Officer Richard Okaane did not sail with her.
Okaane had been promoted to commander and assigned to take command of USS Tang, then under construction.
Morton’s new executive officer was Lieutenant Richard Henderson, competent, experienced, but not the partnership between Morton and Okaane had been extraordinary.
Okaane at the Periscope, Morton analyzing tactics.
They functioned as one brain with four eyes.
They had sunk 19 ships together across five patrols.
Now Morton would prove he could achieve the same results with a new team.
Wahoo topped off at Midway on September 13th.
Morton’s orders were explicit.
Penetrate the Sea of Japan through La Peru’s straight.
Attack shipping between Honchu and Korea.
Report position daily.
Exit through the same straight.
Return to Pearl Harbor by October 21st.
Standard patrol duration 42 days.
Morton had one advantage this patrol.
USS Sawfish would enter the Sea of Japan 2 days after Wahoo.
Two submarines, coordinated attacks, double the pressure on Japanese shipping.
But Morton would operate independently.
He preferred hunting alone.
Wahoo entered La Peru’s straight on the night of September 20th.
Morton chose the same route he’d used in August.
surface transit at maximum speed.
Lookouts spotted two patrol boats.
Morton evaded both.
By dawn on September 21st, Wahoo was inside the Sea of Japan.
Morton submerged to periscope depth and began hunting.
Between September 21st and October 5th, Morton attacked every target he found.
Japanese records later confirmed Wahoo sank four ships during this period.
Conron Maru on October 5th, 8,000 tons, 544 lives lost.
Three smaller cargo ships between September 25th and October 2nd.
Total tonnage, 13,000 tons.
Morton’s aggressive tactics were working.
He was averaging one ship every 4 days.
But Morton didn’t know the Japanese had changed their anti-ubmarine tactics.
After Wahoo’s August penetration, the Imperial Japanese Navy reinforced La Peru straight defenses.
more patrol boats, more aircraft, better coordination between surface and air forces, and new standing orders.
Any submarine contact in La Peru Strait would be attacked with maximum force until confirmed destroyed.
On October 11th, Morton prepared to exit the Sea of Japan.
Wahoo had been submerged most of the day, conserving battery power for the nighttime surface transit through La Peru Straight.
At 1600 hours, Mortyn surfaced to recharge batteries and make final preparations.
Lookouts scanned the horizon.
Clear skies, light winds, good conditions for transit.
At 1700 hours, a Japanese patrol plane spotted Wahoo on the surface.
The pilot was warn officer Shigotaka Iicada flying a Kawanishi E7K reconnaissance float plane from Shirtori Naval Air Base.
IA had been searching for American submarines for 6 weeks.
zero contacts.
Now he had one.
He radioed Wahoo’s position to base and began circling at altitude.
Morton saw the aircraft immediately.
He ordered crash dive.
Wahoo submerged in 43 seconds.
Standard procedure.
Wait underwater until the plane left.
Surface after dark.
Continue to La Peru straight.
Mortyn had evaded Japanese aircraft dozens of times.
This would be no different.
But this time was different.
Aicada didn’t leave.
He marked Wahoo’s position with smoke flares and continued circling.
Within 30 minutes, two more aircraft arrived.
Then, surface ships, patrol boats PB37 and PB39, torpedo boat PB 102, all converging on Wahoo’s last known position.
Morton was trapped.
Seven hours of daylight remaining, multiple aircraft overhead, three surface ships hunting him, and he needed to surface within the next four hours to recharge batteries for the nighttime transit through La Peru Strait.
The hunt had begun, and this time Morton was the prey.
Morton kept Wahoo at 200 ft.
Silent running, minimum speed, every unnecessary system shut down.
The crew moved in absolute silence.
No talking.
No unnecessary movement.
Sound carried through water.
Japanese surface ships had hydrophones.
Any noise could give away Wahoo’s position.
At 1730, the first depth charge pattern dropped.
Six charges detonated 200 yd from Wahoo’s position.
Too far to cause damage, but close enough to tell Morton the Japanese knew approximately where he was.
The explosions shook Wahoo violently.
Light fixtures rattled.
Cork insulation dust filled the air.
Men grabbed hand holds and waited.
Morton changed course southwest away from the depth charge pattern.
Wahoo moved at two knots, barely enough to maintain depth control.
The Japanese ships above continued their search pattern.
Morton could hear their propellers through the hull.
High-pitched wine getting louder, moving closer.
At 1,800 hours, a second depth charge pattern dropped.
12 charges this time.
Closer.
150 yards.
The explosions lifted Wahoo’s stern and slammed it back down.
Glass shattered in the control room.
A hydraulic line burst.
Men worked in darkness using emergency lighting to repair the damage.
No one spoke.
Hand signals only.
Morton knew his situation was deteriorating.
Battery power was dropping.
He had maybe 3 hours before he’d be forced to surface.
The Japanese knew that they would wait, keep him submerged, force him up after dark, then attack with everything they had.
At 1900 hours, Morton made a calculated decision.
He would try to break through the Japanese cordon while some daylight remained.
Move at maximum underwater speed.
Take the risk.
Better than waiting until batteries died and losing all control.
He ordered a head full.
Wahoo accelerated to 8 knots course northeast straight toward La Peru straight.
The Japanese heard the speed increase immediately.
All three patrol boats turned toward Wahoo’s position.
Aircraft overhead radioed updated coordinates.
At 1915, the third depth charge pattern dropped.
20 charges.
Coordinated attack from all three patrol boats simultaneously.
The explosions hammered Wahoo from three directions.
This pattern was accurate.
Multiple charges detonated within 50 ft of the hall.
The submarine rolled 15° to port.
Men flew across compartments.
Equipment tore loose from bulkheads.
The main electrical panel sparked and went dark.
Emergency systems kicked in.
Damage reports came in from every compartment.
Minor flooding in the forward torpedo room.
Hydraulic system failing.
dive planes responding sluggishly.
Morton fought to maintain depth control.
Without full hydraulic power, the dive planes couldn’t hold Wahoo steady.
She began rising despite ballast tanks being full.
200 ft, 180, 150.
Morton ordered emergency flood.
Pump water into every available tank.
Stop the rise.
It worked.
Wahoo stabilized at 160 ft.
But Morton had a new problem.
He’d used precious compressed air to stop the rise.
Air he needed to surface later, and the Japanese were still hunting.
At 2000 hours, the sun set.
Darkness covered the ocean surface.
Morton had two choices.
Try to escape submerged with failing systems and depleted batteries.
Or surface now.
Take the depth charge hits on the surface where they’d be less effective and fight his way out with deck guns.
Both options were suicide.
Morton chose the third option.
Wait.
Conserve power.
Let the Japanese think he’d escaped.
Surface after midnight when search intensity decreased.
Run the straight at maximum speed.
Wahoo had done it before.
She could do it again.
But at 2100 hours, Morton heard something through the hull that changed everything.
More propellers, more ships arriving.
The Japanese weren’t giving up.
They were reinforcing.
Morton was out of time, out of options, and 79 men were depending on him to make the right decision.
Mortyn waited until 2300 hours.
Battery power was critical, less than 20% remaining, enough for one more hour submerged.
After that, Wahoo would have to surface regardless of what waited above.
Morton made his decision.
Surface at midnight.
Run the straight at flank speed.
fight through whatever forces the Japanese had positioned.
At 2345, Morton brought Wahoo to periscope depth.
He scanned the surface.
Three patrol boats, two to the north, one to the south.
All three moving in search patterns.
Aircraft were gone, too dark for effective patrol.
Morton had a narrow window, maybe 30 minutes.
At midnight exactly, Wahoo surfaced.
Diesels roared to life.
Battery recharge began immediately.
Lookouts scrambled topside.
Morton set course northeast.
Flank speed 21 knots.
La Peru Straight was 15 mi away.
43 minutes at maximum speed.
If the Japanese didn’t detect them, the patrol boats detected them within 6 minutes.
Search lights snapped on.
One patrol boat turned to intercept.
Morton ordered the deck gun manned.
Wahoo’s 4-inch gun crew scrambled topside.
Range to patrol boat 3,000 yards, closing fast.
The patrol boat opened fire first.
25 mm cannon.
Tracers arked across the water.
Most fell short.
Morton’s gun crew returned fire.
The first round missed.
Second round hit.
The patrol boat’s search light exploded.
Third round struck the wheelhouse.
The patrol boat slowed and turned away, trailing smoke, but the other two patrol boats were closing and something else.
Morton’s radar operator reported aircraft inbound, multiple contacts 5 mi out.
The Japanese had scrambled nightcapable aircraft from Shirtori Naval Air Base.
Morton calculated the numbers.
Aircraft would arrive in 4 minutes.
Patrol boats would intercept in 8.
Wahoo needed 10 minutes to reach the safety of deeper water outside the straight.
Morton pushed Wahoo’s diesels to emergency power, 22 knots.
The engines screamed.
Black smoke poured from the exhausts, but the speed wasn’t enough.
At 07 on October 11th, the first aircraft arrived overhead, a Kawanishi E7K, the same type that had spotted Wahoo 9 hours earlier.
The pilot, Sergeant Kazuo Takatsuka, had orders to attack any submarine on the surface.
He armed three Type 97 depth bombs, each weighed 60 kg, designed to explode on contact with water, effective against surfaced submarines.
Takatsuka positioned his aircraft directly over Wahoo’s course and dove.
Morton saw the aircraft diving.
He ordered crash dive, but Wahoo needed 90 seconds to submerge from flank speed.
Vents had to open.
Ballast tanks had to flood.
The submarine had to slow down first.
Too many steps, not enough time.
Takatsuka released his bombs at 300 ft altitude.
All three fell in a tight pattern.
The first bomb struck the water 30 ft ahead of Wahoo’s bow.
The second struck 10 ft to port.
The third hit directly on the forward deck near the conning tower.
The explosion poure through Wahoo’s pressure hole.
Water flooded the forward torpedo room instantly.
The bulkhead between the torpedo room and forward battery compartment failed.
Seawater hit the battery cells.
Chlorine gas erupted.
Men in the forward compartments died within seconds, either from the explosion, the flooding, or the gas.
Morton ordered emergency surface.
Blow all ballast.
Get the bow up.
Save whoever could be saved.
But the compressed air system had been damaged in the explosion.
Only partial pressure remained.
Not enough to overcome the flooding forward.
Wahoo’s bow dropped.
30° down angle.
40.
The submarine was going down bow first and there was nothing Morton could do to stop it.
At 015 on October 11th, 1943, Wahoo passed through 200 f feet.
Hole plates groaned under pressure.
Emergency lighting flickered.
Men in the after compartments felt the submarine tilting further downward.
They knew what was coming.
Everyone did.
At 300 ft, the forward compartments imploded.
The pressure hull collapsed like a crushed tin can.
Bulkheads failed in sequence.
control room, conning tower, after battery, each compartment flooding within seconds of the previous one.
Men died instantly from pressure or drowning.
There was no time for escape attempts, no time for final messages, just darkness and crushing water.
Wahoo struck the seafloor at 650 ft at O17.
213 ft of water in La Peru straight.
The impact drove the submarine’s bow into the mud.
Her stern settled moments later.
79 men died.
Commander Dudley Morton, Lieutenant Richard Henderson, 77 sailors and officers.
Not one survived.
Japanese patrol boats circled the area until dawn.
Large quantities of oil floated to the surface.
Debris, cork insulation, wood fragments.
The patrol boat commanders reported a confirmed submarine kill.
The wreckage was too deep for verification, but the evidence was conclusive.
Wahoo was gone.
Admiral Lockwood declared Wahoo overdue on December 2nd, 1943.
She was officially stricken from the Naval Vessel Register on December 6th.
The announcement shocked the submarine force.
Morton was invincible.
Wahoo was unstoppable.
Everyone believed that until they didn’t.
The loss changed Pacific submarine strategy immediately.
No more penetrations of the Sea of Japan until mine detecting equipment became available.
That wouldn’t happen until June 1945, 20 months later.
By then, the war was nearly over.
In postwar analysis, Morton’s record was adjusted.
He had claimed more ships than he actually sank.
Torpedo failures explained most of the discrepancy.
Final confirmed total 19 ships, 55,000 tons.
Morton ranked third among American submarine commanders in ships sunk.
Only Richard Okain and Eugene Flucky surpassed him.
Both men learned their tactics from Morton.
Morton received four Navy crosses.
The fourth was awarded postumously.
Admiral Lockwood later wrote that Morton’s aggressive tactics revolutionized submarine warfare.
First to penetrate an enemy harbor, first to successfully use the downthroat shot.
First to wipe out an entire convoy single-handed.
Morton accomplished in 10 months what took other commanders entire careers.
In 1960, Admiral Lockwood wrote the forward for a book about Wahoo.
He described Morton as a natural leader and born daredevil.
He wrote that when a man like Morton commanded a submarine, the result could only be a fighting ship of the highest order with officers and men who would follow their skipper to the gates of hell.
And they did.
In 2005, Russian divers discovered Wahoo’s wreck in La Peru Strait.
The US Navy confirmed the identification in October 2006.
The submarine sits upright on the seafloor.
Her conning tower shows damage consistent with aerial bombing.
The wreck is a protected war grave.
No salvage operations are permitted.
Morton was declared legally deceased on January 7th, 1946.
The destroyer, USS Morton, was named in his honor.
His decorations included four Navy crosses and the Army Distinguished Service Cross.
He never received the Medal of Honor.
Some historians believe the Buyaru incident prevented that recognition.
But Morton’s legacy transcends medals.
He proved submarines could hunt aggressively, attack on the surface, charge destroyers.
His tactics became standard doctrine.
Every submarine commander who followed studied Morton’s patrols.
They learned from his successes and his final mistake.
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