The dynamics between the Bellarus and Ukraine border lines began changing in a very short time.
If you recall, Zalinsky gave Lucenko a clear ultimatum on June 19th, demanding he cut logistical support for Russia.
And the time granted to Bellarus for this was only 7 days.
Within this process, the possibility that Putin would intervene and force Bellarus into risky steps was among the scenarios.
But the Bellarusian leaders stepped back unexpectedly.
On June 22nd, he decided to shut down the repeater antennas that guide Russian drones and cruise missiles along the border.
This single move became a very critical turning point on the path to making Kiev’s approximately 1,085 km northern border more secure.
Zalinski by showing he could influence even Putin’s closest ally significantly strengthened his hand against Moscow.
Now one of the most critical obstacles to opening a new threat front against Ukraine through Bellarusian territory appears to have been removed at least for now.
This retreat should not be interpreted as a gesture of goodwill.
The force behind this retreat is not ideology but money.
Bellarus operates two major refineries Mosir and Novapalotsk with a combined capacity of 24 million tons per year.
With Ukraine systematically striking Russia’s refineries, these facilities turned into Lucenko’s gold mine.
In the first five months of 2026, gasoline exports from Bellarus to Russia increased 13fold compared to the previous year.
Before the war, sales to Russia were minimal because the EU market was more profitable.
Now the roles have completely reversed and the business model is even more absurd.
Russia sends its own crude oil to Bellarus.
Bellarus refineses it and sells the product back to Russia.
The price cap the Russian government applies in the domestic market does not apply to Bellarus’s state company Bell Nefkim.
So Bellarusian fuel is sold at market price and this price is 1.
5 to two times the Russian equivalent.
Deputy Prime Minister Novak set a target of 300,000 tons of Bellarusian gasoline per month.
Lucenko is earning a fortune from Russia’s crisis and Zalinski’s ultimatum touched the key to this fortune.
Zalinski emphasized they were monitoring fuel deliveries to Russia.
He said they weren’t making threats, just observing and they believed him.
If Ukraine targets Mosir or Nova Palotsk, Lucenko’s most profitable business collapses overnight.
And the powerful people benefiting from this profit chain won’t thank Lucenko either.
The cost of shutting down the repeaters is low.
The cost of losing the refineries is devastating.
Lucenko did the math and shut them down.
But the Bellarusian leader move should not be interpreted as goodwill.
Something much bigger is being built on the border and the scale of this construction is incomparable to the repeater issue.
Ukrainian foreign intelligence service chief Oleg Lugavski briefed President Zalinski directly.
He reported that Bellarus is building military infrastructure across five separate sectors along the Ukrainian border and this construction is nearing completion.
Along a line stretching from Cobran to Gal, ammunition depots, fuel and lubricant storage bases and roads designed for military convoy movements are being discussed.
Zalinsky emphasized this infrastructure has no purpose other than military.
And the more concerning detail, Russian documents describe these works in the context of tasks of the special military operation.
In other words, this is not Bellarus’s own defense preparation.
It’s a direct part of Russia’s Ukraine war planning.
Ukrainian border guard spokesperson Demchenko had clearly summarized the situation in May.
He noted that there is currently no major Russian force buildup in Barus, but the infrastructure being built could be activated at any moment.
So why is this infrastructure so concerning? Because in 2022, precisely this deficiency led to Russia’s failure.
In February 2022, 30,000 Russian soldiers were deployed to Bellarus under the guise of exercises and advanced from there toward Kiev.
Only 90 km from the border to the capital.
But there were no proper roads, no prepositioned ammunition and fuel depots, and logistics planning was inadequate.
Tanks formed 60 km cues on narrow forested roads.
Fuel ran out.
Resupply convoys became targets for Ukrainian drones and the offensive stopped with logistics collapse.
After the harrowing situations experienced in BHA and Pin, Russia withdrew, calling it a goodwill gesture.
Now the infrastructure being built completes everything that was missing in 2022.
Proper roads, ammunition depots, and fuel bases.
Bellpole, a group consisting of former military and security personnel opposed to Lucenko, documented that more than 500 Bellarusian industrial facilities have been integrated into Russia’s war machine.
A large firing range and barracks construction in the Gal region was reported to be ongoing.
The Hudson Institute defined three attack scenarios this infrastructure could support.
The first scenario is a direct assault on Kev only 90 km from the Bellarus border to the capital and the same route attempted and failed in 2022.
The second scenario is a western raid bypassing Kev to target transportation hubs in Lutk and Rivna and cut weapon supply lines from the west.
The third scenario is opening the northern front and expanding the existing front line by 160 km.
the exact scenario Ukrainian armed forces commander-in-chief Sir Cirki warned about.
Sirki clearly laid out the concrete consequences of this risk.
Increasing the strength of existing units is not enough.
New brigades need to be formed and forming these brigades means pulling resources from the fighting in the east and south.
Exactly what Russia actually wants.
According to the Atlantic Council’s report, Bellarus is quietly preparing to play a larger role in Russia’s war and preparations continue regardless of Lucenko’s statements.
On the other hand, on June 22nd, Pavo Latusko on behalf of the Bellarusian United Transition Cabinet delivered a 30-page official report to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andre Sabha.
This report is a file containing eight concrete pieces of evidence that Bellarus is directly preparing for armed conflict.
The report’s most fundamental finding is the preparation of legal ground, neutrality, and nuclear weapon-free status were removed from the Bellarusian constitution, and the state was given the authority for preventive attack.
In other words, Bellarus can now constitutionally legitimize an offensive war.
While the legal ground is being prepared, the army is also expanding.
Contract soldier numbers increased 1.
5 times since 2022.
The mobilization reserve reached 289,000 people and a southern operational command directly facing the Ukrainian border is being established.
The total force is projected to exceed 80,000.
In addition, a 150,000 strong people’s militia is being formed and Russia’s practices are being copied.
Exactly.
Conscription notification via SMS and recruitment of prisoners.
Defense spending increased five-fold in four years and more than 4,000 new pieces of military equipment were accepted in 2024.
Other evidence in the report completes the picture.
Fortification construction along the border continues.
Zapad 2025, the Russia Bellarus joint war rehearsal in September 2025 included nuclear weapons usage training and the Areshnik missile system and Bellarus fired an Iscander missile.
The exercise was perceived so seriously that Poland closed its border and Lithuania and Latvia restricted their airspace.
In December, Russia announced the Orreshnik nuclear missile system was deployed to Bellarus.
Ambassador Grislov presented this as verification of the alliance agreement’s effectiveness.
Medical infrastructure is being prepared for wartime casualty care.
Society is being systematically conditioned with war propaganda and schools are being militarized.
Ukraine’s Achilles unmanned systems brigade commander Yuri Federenko assessing this evidence said Lucenko will probably join the war and Bellarusian young people will go to die and Bellarusian opposition leaders Fatlan Tikanoskaya put the message clearly Russian tanks must never again march from Bellarus to Chihiv Ztomir Rivna or Kiev Bellarus’s fate depends on Ukraine’s success.
The opposition claims Bellarus is preparing for war.
However, Lucenko gave such contradictory messages in the last 10 days that understanding his true intentions is becoming increasingly difficult.
The chronology reveals this most clearly.
On June 16th, Lucenko apologized to Zilinski in his Al Arabia interview for the harsh words he used.
But this apology was itself a contradiction.
On one hand, he expressed regret.
On the other, he couldn’t help himself from belittling Zalinski as young, inexperienced, and not even a soldier.
In the same interview, while admitting Bellarus is very vulnerable militarily and within Ukraine’s grasp, he didn’t neglect to issue the threat, “You’ll reap what you sow.
” Opposition leader Fitlan Oskaya immediately deciphered this hypocrisy.
The man who first told Ukraine’s surrender is now apologizing.
This is proof that Ukraine’s strength clearly reveals the dictatorship’s weakness.
Then Zilinski gave Bellarus the ultimatum on repeater equipment and Lucenko complied with this ultimatum in just 5 days.
Then June 25th came.
All of Lucenko’s faces took the stage in a single day.
That morning, looking Russian ambassador Grislov in the face, he asked him to avoid dragging Bellarus into war, adding he discussed this with Putin a thousand times and Bellarusians don’t want to fight Ukrainians.
But in the same meeting, he turned to the Moscow Oblast governor and said they’re ready to provide every kind of assistance to Russia in economy and security areas.
He deliberately placed fuel sales, war industry integration, and logistics support under this commitment.
Bellarusian state news agency published the words directed at Grislov.
But Russia’s TAS agency completely removed the same statement from its reports.
To Zilinsk’s representatives, he showed yet another face.
He conveyed the message that if anyone thinks they can drag Bellarus into war, the nature of the war would change instantly.
The same Lucenko belittled soldiers on the Ukrainian border as tractor drivers and milkmaids.
Ukrainian border guard spokesperson Demchenko reminded that the border is minded and entering a state that supports terrorism is impossible, urging citizens strongly not to approach Bellarus.
Lucenko has three separate faces, loyal ally to Putin, threatening neighbor to Zalinski, and peaceful leader to his own people.
He’s trying to play these three roles simultaneously, but the roles increasingly contradict each other, and his room to maneuver narrows a little more every day.
But what narrows his room to maneuver is not Lucenko’s contradictions.
It’s Moscow’s pressure.
And the scale of this pressure was documented for the first time by a Western media outlet.
The Wall Street Journal in its report based on Russian and European officials stated that Russia has been trying since the beginning of the year to use Bellarusian territory for attacks against Ukraine and hybrid operations against NATO countries.
and it revealed that Russia threatened to cut financial support to force acceptance.
The person conducting these negotiations is Russian ambassador Boris Grislov.
The diplomat Lucenko publicly targeted by name for the first time on June 25th.
According to WSJ’s sources, pressure is not limited to diplomatic channels.
Russia uses Bellarus’s energy subsidies, credit agreements, and trade privileges as leverage.
The Bellarusian economy is 95% dependent on Russian fuel and energy imports.
When Moscow tightens this faucet, Lucenko’s capacity to say no drops dramatically.
And the international community also began seeing the consequences of this pressure.
French President Mcronone called Lucenko in May directly warning him not to enter the war.
The first phone call between the two leaders since the 2022 full-scale invasion.
This call is an indicator of how seriously Maccron takes the Bellarus threat.
Zalinski sent a different message.
He approved a 40-day operation targeting Russia’s energy infrastructure and war capacity, signaling that this operation scope could also include the logistical support Bellarus provides to Russia.
Lucenko is trapped between two fires.
Moscow is pulling toward war.
The West is warning not to enter.
His own people don’t want war.
and Ukraine is threatening his refineries.
But the most critical point WSJ’s sources emphasized is this.
There is not yet a concrete sign that Bellarusian territory is being used for military operations.
But this possibility has not left the table and the infrastructure is becoming ready.
The decision depends not on Lucenko’s will but on Putin’s patience.
However, Ukraine is preparing for the consequences of that decision.
Ukraine has systematically transformed the northern border into a fortress over the past 2 years.
According to the Western Operational Commands report, the entire 1,085 km Bellarus border has been fortified.
The natural terrain of the Picia region further strengthens this defense line.
In the most dangerous areas, minefields are being expanded, trenches are being dug, and anti-tank barriers are being placed.
In 2022, Russian tanks had passed through this terrain almost unobstructed.
Now the same route has been converted into a death corridor.
But fortification alone is not enough.
Ukraine is also preparing with technology.
On June 16th, Sirki ordered the establishment of special unmanned system units on the Bellarus border.
Drone units equipped for reconnaissance, enemy engagement, and area protection.
The regional defense forc’s drone capacity is being expanded and anti- drone nets against Russian drones are being installed specifically on border roads in the Volan region.
Behind this preparation is a concrete threat map.
On June 21st, Zalinski pointed to four separate Russian Bellarusian repeaters in the Gomel and Breast regions.
These were guiding Russia’s attacks on railway and energy infrastructure in the Giier, Rivna and Vololan regions.
At the same time, Bellarusian facilities are supplying critical components for Russian armored vehicles and missile systems.
Sirki also announced new brigades would be formed, a direct response to intelligence that Russia plans five new brigades and additional divisions to expand the front 160 km from the north.
In Sirk’s words, when the front grows in both width and depth, the math is clear.
New military units are needed.
But Ukraine’s sharpest weapon is not defense lines.
It’s the unmanned systems forces.
Established in 2024, this unit is the world’s first military force dedicated to drone warfare and at the center of the power, transforming Ukraine into a global military technology laboratory.
Numbers make this superiority concrete.
Ukraine produced 4 million unmanned systems in 2025 and aims to increase this number to 5 to 6 million in 2026.
Although Russia produces six times more drones in quantity, Ukraine maintains quality superiority and all this capacity is converting into deterrence.
Unmanned systems forces commander Madar openly announced they identified 500 potential targets in Bellarus and sent a direct warning to Lucenko.
Still, this superiority is not unlimited.
Retired General Ben Hajes noted Ukraine’s long range strike capacity is in the right direction, but he states gaps still exist in striking deep logistics centers and force buildups and that Russian electronic warfare is making GPS guidance increasingly difficult.
Does all this mean Bellarus won’t enter the war? Giving a definitive answer to this question is difficult because there are strong arguments in both directions.
The reasons suggesting it won’t enter are serious.
The Bellarusian army’s official strength is 48,600, a force incomparably small compared to Russia’s 1.
5 million.
Minsk based military analyst Alexander Allesen describes this army as unsuitable for offensive operations and says a mobilization of 500,000 people would be needed for a real attack.
This means pulling the entire working male population from the economy.
Public pressure is also large.
Independent surveys show 80% of Bellarusians are against war.
In 2020, millions took to the streets against Lucenko and the regime only survived with Russia’s support.
Entering the war could re-trigger this suppressed anger.
Carnegie Foundation’s analysis is also measured.
There is no clear sign that the direct threat level has increased compared to 2024 or 2025.
And it notes that Kiev’s Bellarus warnings could partly be a strategy to draw support from Western allies.
But all these arguments were also valid in 2022 and Russia still attacked from Bellarusian territory.
The Bellarusian army didn’t attack independently, but 30,000 Russian soldiers used Bellarus as a base benefited from Bellarusian logistics and Bellarusian airspace was used as a corridor for Russian missile attacks.
So the real question is not whether Bellarus will enter the war.
It’s whether Russia can use Bellarusian territory again and whether Lucenko has the capacity to say no.
Lucenko may not want war.
But if Putin wants it, Lucenko may not have the luxury of saying no.
So, what do you think about this? Share your thoughts in the comments.
We will continue to follow these developments.
Disclaimer : This content may be created by AI for entertainment purposes. Any resemblance to real persons, events, or places is coincidental.
